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LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-DUTY OF EMPLOYER TO ALLOW

TIME STUDY-A dispute arose between the employer and the union
as to whether certain duties performed by an employee should be classified as "special assignments" as defined in the labor contract. If these
duties were "special assignments" the employee was entitled to a higher
job classification. Before arrangements could be made for the third step
of the grievance procedure the union asked for permission to enter the
plant and analyze the job. Permission was denied by the management and
the union filed a charge of unlawful refusal to bargain. The trial examiner
found that by refusing the union's request the employer had violated sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (5) of the amended National Labor Relations Act.1
On consideration by the Board, held, since there was no evidence of any
dispute as to the duties performed by the employee but only as to the
classification of these duties, the union had no right to enter the plant
and make a time study. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. No.
105, 36 L.R.R.M. 1416 (1955).
The Board has consistently held that there are certain types of information which the employer must furnish to the union.2 Thus, if any information possessed by the employer is relevant to collective bargaininlf or
would aid the union in policing the labor contract,4 a refusal to make it
known to the union is a violation of section 8 (a) (5). It is also agreed that
an employer violates section 8 (a) (I) if he denies union officials access to
company property when the refusal unreasonably impedes the free ex-

UNION

lLabor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. L. 140, 141, 29 U.S.C. (1952)
§158 (a) (1) (5).
2 Among the cases in which the NLRB has required employers to furnish information
to the union are: Electric Auto-Lite Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1950) (merit ratings); Montgomery Ward and Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1950) (merit ratings); Stilley Plywood Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 932 (1951) (job classifications and rates).
3 Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, (7th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 485; NLRB v. LelandGifford Co., (1st Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 620.
4Hastings and Sons Publishing Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 708 (1953).
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ercise of the rights guaranteed employees by the act. 5 There is a substantial difference in the burden of proof involved in the two cases. If
the union seeks wage information, it need only show the relevance6 of
that information, but if it seeks access it must show unreasonable employer
interference with the free exercise of employee rights.7 Two of the
majority members considered the principal case a right-of-access problem
while the two dissenters felt that the union's demand should have been
treated as a request for information. Although Member Rodgers considered the case more closely analogous to the wage information cases than
to the right-of-access cases~ he felt that since there was no evidence of a
dispute as to the specific duties the employee performed, there was no
reason to allow union personnel to enter the plant and make their own
time study.8 Since the dispute concerned the job classification which the
. collective bargaining contract gave the employee, it is obvious that information concerning his duties was relevant to the dispute. It is not so
obvious why the union should have the right to come onto the company's
property and make a time study of the job without showing that the information in their possession was erroneous or incomplete and, if this were
the case, without requesting the employer to provide a more detailed
description of the employee's duties.9 The dissenting view would give the
union this right at any time and under any circumstances, unless the employer could show that the resulting disruption in production and discipline would make the union request unreasonable. Requiring the employer to make such a showing before he could :nefuse to let union officials
on his property seems unjustifiable. Traditionally, the owners of private
property have had the power to exclude anyone they wished from their
property, including union officers. Under its established national labor
policy, Congress did not attempt to eliminate the rights of the property
5 Thus, access was allowed tci company property in W. T. Carter and Brother, 90
N.L.R..B. 2020 (1950) (company-owned towns); Weyerhauser Timber Co., 31 N.L.R.B. 258
(1941) (lumber camps); American-West African Lines, 21 NL.R..B. 691 (1940) (ships).
6 In Hearst Corp., 113 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 36 L.R..R.M. 1454 (1955), the Board held
that a union's right to receive relevant information can be waived either expressly or
impliedly by the contract and in Oregon Coast Operations Assn., 113 NL.R.B. No. 127,
36 L.R.R.M. 1448 (1955), the Board used the term "basic information" and implied that
there was information which, though relevant, was not basic and that the union had no
statutory right to other than basic information. The type of information listed in the
cases cited in note 2 supra and the type desired in the principal case would qualify as
basic information.
7 Although the Board has never expressly stated that it was necessary to prove unreasonable interference before access to company property will be allowed, it is notable
that in those cases where access to company property has been allowed the Board did find
unreasonable interference with employee rights. See the cases cited in note 5 supra•
• 8 During the processing of the grievance there had been no controversy as to the type
of duties performed by the employee but only as to the classification which these duties
warranted.
9 The dissent felt that the mere fact that the union wanted to conduct a time ·study
was sufficient evidence that there was a dispute as to the duties performed by the employ~ even though there was no other evidence of such a dispute.
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owner but only to curtail the employer's property rights when they conflicted with the declared rights of employees. It follows that before the
Board should require the employer to give up a traditional property right,
the employee must show that this is necessary in order to safeguard one of
his declared rights. This is the gist of the Board's decision in the principal
case. There is no denial of necessary information to the union, nor is the
union required to use unreasonable and expensive methods of acquiring
the information. 10 The Board has said only that when they feel the union
already possesses the necessary information, the union has no basis for
claiming a right to come on the company premises to secure this information in a different manner.11
Paul A. Heinen, S.Ed.

10 The NLRB has previously held that an employer's refusal to furnish information
regarding wages is not excused by the fact that the union could conceivably acquire this
information by the cumbersome and time-consuming process of consulting individually
with all the employees. B. F. Goodrich Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1151 (1950).
11A prior Board decision, Otis Elevator Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 770 (1953), held that an
employer had to allow a separate time study by the union, but in view of the subsequent
circuit court ruling in NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., (2d Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 176, which
enforced that portion of the Board's order requiring the employer to furnish the union
with the results of his time study but refused to enforce the portion requiring the employer to allow the union to make its own time study, the Board was justified in not
considering itself bound by its prior decision.

